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Abstract
This paper presents a way of formalising definite descriptions with a
binary quantifier ι, where ιxrF,Gs is read as ‘The F is G’. Introduction and
elimination rules for ι in a system of intuitionist negative free logic are
formulated. Procedures for removing maximal formulas of the form ιxrF,Gs
are given, and it is shown that deductions in the system can be brought into
normal form.
1 Introduction
The definite description operator ι, the formal analogue of the definite article
‘the’, is usually taken to be a term forming operator: if A is a predicate, then
ιxA is a term denoting the sole A, if there is one, or nothing or an arbitrary
object if there is no or more than one A. This paper follows a different approach
to definite descriptions by formalising them instead with a primitive binary
quantifier: ι forms a formula from two predicates, and ‘The F is G’ is formalised
as ιxrFx,Gxs. The notation, and the way of treating definite descriptions that
comes with it, was suggested by Dummett (Dummett, 1981, p.162).1
The current paper treats definite descriptions purely proof theoretically. The
proof theory of a term forming ι operator has been investigated in the context
of sequent calculi for classical free logic by Indrzejczak Indrzejczak (2018a,b).
Tennant gives rules for such an operator in natural deduction (Tennant, 2004,
p.110).2 The approach followed here may be new to the literature.
In this paper, I investigate the binary quantifier ι in the context of a system
of natural deduction for intuitionist negative free logic. The application of the
1Bostock considers a similar approach and explains definite descriptions as a special case of
restricted quantification, where the restriction is to a single object. (Bostock, 1997, Sec. 8.4) Bostock
writes pIx : Fxq Gx for ‘The F is G’, but prefers to treat definite descriptions with a term forming
operator. I owe the reference to Bostock to a referee for this journal, who also pointed me to the
paper by Scott to be referred to in footnote 4 and made valuable comments on this paper.
2Tennant is not explicit whether the logic in this paper is classical or intuitionist. However, as
he is partial to anti-realism and constructive mathematics, we are justified in assuming that his
preferred route is to add these rules to a system of intuitionist free logic. The rules are also in
(Tennant, 1978, Ch. 7.10), where the logic is classical.
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present treatment of definite descriptions to other systems of logic and their
comparisons to systems known from the literature are left for further papers.
To anticipate, using a negative free logic, the approach proposed here lends
itself to a natural formalisation of a Russellian theory of definite descriptions,
while it provides a natural formalisation of Lambert’s minimal theory of definite
descriptions when the logic is positive and free.
First, notation. I will use Axt to denote the result of replacing all free
occurrences of the variable x in the formula A by the term t or the result of
substituting t for the free variable x in A. t is free for x in A means that no
(free) occurrences of a variable in t become bound by a quantifier in A after
substitution. In using the notation Axt I assume that t is free for x in A or that
the bound variables of A have been renamed to allow for substitution without
‘clashes’ of variables, but for clarity I also often mention the condition that t is
free for x in A explicitly. I also use the notation Ax to indicate that x is free in A,
and At for the result of substituting t for x in A.
2 Natural Deduction for ι in Intuitionist Logic
The introduction and elimination rules for the propositional logical constants of
intuitionist logic I are:
A B^I: A^ B
A^ B^E: A
A^ B
B
i
A
Π
BÑ I: iAÑ B
AÑ B AÑ E: B
A_I: A_ B
B
A_ B A_ B
i
A
Π
C
i
B
Σ
C_E: iC
KKE: B
where the conclusion B of KE is restricted to atomic formulas.
The introduction and elimination rules for the quantifiers of I are:
Axy@I: @xA
@xA@E: Axt
where in @I, y is not free in any undischarged assumptions that Axy depends on,
and either y is the same as x or y is not free in A; and in @E, t is free for x in A.
AxtDI: DxA DxA
i
Axy
Π
CDE: iC
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where in DI, t is free for x in A; and in DE, y is not free in C nor any undischarged
assumptions it depends on in Π except Axy, and either y is the same as x or it is
not free in A.
The introduction and elimination rules for identity are:
“ I: t “ t
t1 “ t2 Axt1“ E: Axt2
where A is an atomic formula. To exclude vacuous applications of “ E, we
can require that x is free in A and that t1 and t2 are different. An induction
over the complexity of formulas shows that the rule holds for formulas of any
complexity.
To formalise definite descriptions, one could add the binary quantifier ι to I.
Its introduction and elimination rules would be:
Fxt G
x
t
i
Fxz
Π
z “ t
ιI : i
ιxrF,Gs
where t is free for x in F and in G, and z is different from x, not free in t and does
not occur free in any undischarged assumptions in Π except Fxz .3
ιxrF,Gs
Fxz
i
, Gxz
iloooomoooon
Π
C
ιE1 : iC
where z is not free in C nor any undischarged assumptions it depends on except
Fxz and Gxz , and either z is the same as x or it is not free in F nor in G.
ιxrF,Gs Fxt1 Fxt2
ιE2 : t1 “ t2
where t1 and t2 are free for x in F.
For simplicity we could require that x occurs free in F andG. If we don’t, the truth
or falsity of ιxrF,Gsmay depend on properties of the domain of quantification:
if F is true and does not contain x free, then ιxrF,Gs is false if there is more than
one thing in the domain of quantification, and it is true if there is only one thing
and G is true (of the one thing, if x is free in G).
ιxrF,Gs and DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq are interderivable. Notice that the
rules for identity are not applied in the two deductions to follow.
1. ιxrF,Gs $ DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq
Let y be different from x and not free in F or G:
3A more precise and general statement of the introduction rule for ι would result if we were to
require Π to be a deduction of py “ tqyz from pFxyqyz , where y is different from x and not free in t, and
either z is the same as y or z is not free in Fxy nor in y “ t.
3
ιxrF,Gs
ιxrF,Gs 1Fxy 2F
ιE2y “ x
1pFxy Ñ y “ xq
@ypFxy Ñ y “ xq 2F
F^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq 2G
pF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq
DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq
2 ιE1DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq
2. DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq $ ιxrF,Gs
Let y be different from x and not free in F or G, and let
Ç
be the formula
pF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq:
DxÇ
2Ç
F
2Ç
G
2Ç
@ypFxy Ñ y “ xq
Fxy Ñ y “ x 1Fxy
y “ x
1 ιI
ιxrF,Gs
2
ιxrF,Gs
3 Intuitionist Free Logic
It is more interesting to add the ι quantifier to a free logic. I will use formalisations
of intuitionist free logic with a primitive predicate D!, to be interpreted as ‘x
exists’ or ‘x refers’ or ‘x denotes’. The introduction and elimination rules for the
quantifiers are:
iD!y
Π
Axy@I : i@xA
@xA D!t@E : Axt
where in @I, y does not occur free in any undischarged assumptions of Π except
D!y, and either y is the same as x or y is not free in A; and in @E, t is free for x in
A.
Axt D!tDI : DxA DxA
Axy
i
, D!y iloooomoooon
Π
CDE : iC
where in DI, t is free for x in A; and in DE, y is not free in C nor any undischarged
assumptions of Π, except Axy and D!y, and either y is the same as x or it is not
free in A.
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The elimination rule for identity in intuitionist free logic is the same as in I.
In intuitionist positive free logic IPF, identity has the same introduction rule
as in intuitionist logic, i.e. $ t “ t, for any term t. Semantically speaking, in
positive free logic any statement of self-identity is true, irrespective of whether
a term refers or not.
In intuitionist negative free logic INF the introduction rule for identity is
weakened and requires an existential premise:
D!t“ In : t “ t
In INF the existence of ti may be inferred if ti occurs in an atomic formula:
At1 . . . tnAD : D!ti
where A is an n-place predicate letter (including identity) and 1 ď i ď n.
Speaking semantically, for an atomic sentence, including identities, to be true,
all terms in it must refer. If the language has function symbols, there is also the
rule of functional denotation:
D! f t1 . . . tn
FD : D!ti
where f is an n-place function letter and 1 ď i ď n. Speaking semantically, for
the value of a function to exist, all of its arguments must exist. “ In, AD and FD
are called the rules of strictness.4
Hintikka’s Law D!tØ Dx x “ t, where x not in t, is provable in INF and IPF.
In IPF, it suffices to observe the following:
t “ t D!t
Dx x “ t Dx x “ t
1x “ t 1D!x
D!t
1D!t
In INF, conclude t “ t from D!t.
The degree of a formula is the number of connectives occurring in it. K,
being a connective, is of degree 1. This excludes the superfluous case in which
K is inferred from K by KE. D!t is an atomic formula of degree 0.
The major premise of an elimination rule is the premise with the connective
that the rule governs. The other premises are minor premises. A maximal formula
is one that is the conclusion of an introduction rule and the major premise of an
elimination rule for its main connective. A segment is a sequence of formulas of
the same shape, all minor premises and conclusions of _E or DE, except the first
and the last one; the first is only a minor premise, the last only a conclusion. A
segment is maximal if its first formula has been derived by an application of
an introduction rule for its main connective, and its last formula is the major
premise of an elimination rule. A deduction is in normal form if it contains neither
4INF is the system introduced by Scott (Scott, 1979) and called Nie by Troelstra and Schwichten-
berg (Troestra and Schwichtenberg, 2000, 200), but with a simpler theory of identity. It is the system
that results if classical reductio ad absurdum, the rule that licenses the derivation of A if  A entails a
contradiction, is not taken to form part of the system Tennant presents in (Tennant, 1978, Ch. 7.10).
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maximal formulas nor maximal segments. A normalisation theorem establishes
that any deduction can be brought into normal form by applying reduction
procedures for the removal of maximal formulas from deductions and permutative
reduction procedures for reducing maximal segments to maximal formulas.
Notice that the conditions imposed on applications of “ E have the conse-
quence that there are no maximal formulas of the form t1 “ t2.
AD and FD have the characteristics of introduction rules for D!, and “ Im
has the characteristics of an elimination rule for it. In a sense @E and DI of free
logic also eliminate formulas of the form D!t. I will, however, not count these
rules as introduction and elimination rules for D!, as there is no general way of
removing formulas of the form D!t that have been concluded by AD or FD and
are premises of “ In, @E or DI.
Proofs of the normalisation theorem for intuitionist logic, such as those
given by Prawitz (Prawitz, 1965, Ch. IV.1) and Troelstra and Schwichtenberg
(Troestra and Schwichtenberg, 2000, Ch. 6.1), can be modified to carry over to
the intuitionist free logics considered here.
A normalisation theorem for intuitionist negative free logic with a term
forming ι operator can be reconstructed from material Tennant provides in
Tennant (1978). In particular, as in the case of I, we can assume that every
application of @I and DE has its own variable, that is, the free variable y of
an application of such a rule occurs only in the hypotheses discharged by the
rule and formulas concluded from them and, for @I, in the premise of that
rule and the formulas it has been derived from. This way we avoid ‘clashes’
between the restrictions on the variables of different application of these rules
when reduction procedures are applied to a deduction containing maximal
formulas. Applying the reduction procedures for quantifiers of free logic can
only introduce maximal formulas of lower degree than the one removed. I leave
the details to the reader.
4 Natural Deduction for ι in INF
The interderivability of ιxrF,Gs and DxpF ^ @ypFxy Ñ x “ yq ^ Gq is the hall
mark of a Russellian theory of definite descriptions, in which any statement
of the form ‘The F is G’ is false if there is no F or if there is more than one.
It is the generally accepted treatment of definite descriptions in negative free
logic. To establish how to modify the rules for ι given in Section 2 to yield a
Russellian theory of definite descriptions when the logic is intuitionist negative
free logic, we analyse the deductions establishing the interderivability of ιxrF,Gs
and DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ x “ yq ^ Gq in I given at the end of that section.
Looking at the derivation of DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ x “ yq ^ Gq from ιxrF,Gs, had
the application of the universal quantifier introduction rule be one of free logic, it
would have allowed the discharge of an assumption D!y, and had the existential
quantifier introduction rule been one of free logic, a further assumption D!x
would have been required. Both lend themselves as additional premises of
ιE2, as premises analogous to the existence assumptions in the rules of the
quantifiers of free logic. D!y would be discharged by the application of the
universal quantifier introduction rule of free logic, so in order for the conclusion
of the deduction not to depend on D!x, it would have to be discharged, and
the only option here is that it is discharged by the application of ιE1. This is
6
also a natural option, corresponding, as it does, to the discharge of existence
assumptions by the quantifier rules of free logic.
Generalising the first observation, we add the premises D!t1 and D!t2 to ιE2:
ιxrF,Gs D!t1 D!t2 Fxt1 Fxt2
ιE2 : t1 “ t2
where t1 and t2 are free for x in F.
To implement the second observation, we add D!z as an additional discharged
assumption to ιE1:
ιxrF,Gs
Fxz
i
, Gxz
i
, D!z ilooooooooomooooooooon
Π
C
ιE1 : iC
where is z not free in C nor any undischarged assumptions it depends on except
Fxz , Gxz and D!z, and either z is the same as x or it is not free in F nor in G.
To find suitable modifications of the introduction rule for ι, we look at the
derivation of ιxrF,Gs from DxpF^@ypFxy Ñ x “ yq ^Gq in I. Had the application
of the universal quantifier elimination rule been one of free logic, a further
assumption D!y would have been required, and had the existential quantifier
elimination rule been one of free logic, it would have allowed the discharge
of an assumption D!x. The latter lends itself as an additional premise of ιI, the
former as an additional assumption discharged by that rule, which is again
analogous to the existence assumptions required and discharged in applications
of the rules for the quantifiers of free logic.
Generalising the second observation, we add D!t as a further premise, and to
implement the first observation we add D!z as a further discharged assumption
to ιI:
Fxt G
x
t D!t
Fxz
i
, D!z iloooomoooon
Π
z “ t
ιI : i
ιxrF,Gs
where t is free for x in F and in G, and z is different from x, not free in t and does
not occur free in any undischarged assumptions in Π except Fxz and D!z.5
It is obvious that ιxrF,Gs and DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ x “ yq ^ Gq are interderivable
in INF when ι is governed by the modified rules, but we give the deductions for
convenience.
5A more precise and general statement of the introduction rule for ι would result if we were to
require Π to be a deduction of py “ tqyz from pFxyqyz and D!z, where y is different from x and not free
in t, and either z is the same as y or z is not free in Fxy nor in y “ t.
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1. ιxrF,Gs $ DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq
Let x and y be different variables, where y is not free in F nor in G:
ιxrF,Gs
ιxrF,Gs 2D!y 3D!x 1Fxy 3F
ιE2y “ x
1pFxy Ñ y “ xq
2@ypFxy Ñ y “ xq 3F
F^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq 3G
F^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ G 3D!x
DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq
3 ιE1DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq
2. DxpF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq $ ιxrF,Gs
Let
Ç
be the formula pF^ @ypFxy Ñ y “ xq ^ Gq, where y is different from x and not free in F or G:
DxÇ
2Ç
F
2Ç
G
2D!x
2Ç
@ypFxy Ñ y “ xq 1D!y
Fxy Ñ y “ x 1Fxy
y “ x
1 ιI
ιxrF,Gs
2
ιxrF,Gs
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Let INFι denote the systems of intuitionist negative free logic augmented with the rules for ι given in this section.
In order to prove a normalisation theorem for INFι, we first observe that KE can be restricted to atomic conclusions in this system:
1. Instead of inferring @xA from K, infer Axy, for some y not occurring in any assumption that K depends on, and apply @I, discharging
vacuously.
2. Instead of inferring DxA from K, infer Axt , for some t that is free for x in A, infer D!t, and apply DI.
3. Instead of inferring ιxrF,Gs from K, infer Fxt , Gxt , D!t and z “ t, for some t that is free for x in F and in G and some z that is not free in
any assumption that K depends on, and apply ιI, discharging vacuously.
Next, “ E can be restricted to atomic formulas in INFι. Consider an application of this rule with premise ιxrF,Gsyt1 :
t1 “ t2 ιxrF,Gsyt1
ιxrF,Gsyt2
where t1 and t2 are free for y in ιxrF,Gs. The exclusion of vacuous applications of “ E means that y must be different from x, and so
ιxrF,Gsyt1 is ιxrF
y
t1
,Gyt1s. Let v and z be different variables not occurring in F, G, t1, t2. The induction step applying “ E to subformulas of
ιxrF,Gsyt1 is the following:
ιxrFyt1 ,G
y
t1
s
t1 “ t2
2pFyt1qxz
pFyt2qxz
t1 “ t2
2pGyt1qxz
pGyt2qxz
2D!z
ιxrFyt1 ,G
y
t1
s 1D!v 2D!z 1pFyt1qxv
2pFyt1qxz
ιE2v “ z
1 ιI
ιxrFyt2 ,G
y
t2
s
2 ιE1
ιxrFyt2 ,G
y
t2
s
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As for applications of @I and DE, we can assume that every application of ιI
and ιE1 has its own free variable, i.e. the variable z of an application of ιI or ιE2
occurs only in the premises discharged by the rule and formulas derived from
the discharged premises, and nowhere else in the deduction.
I will now give the reduction procedures for maximal formulas of the
form ιxrF,Gs and the permutative reduction procedures for maximal segments
consisting of a formula of that form.
There are two cases of reduction procedures for maximal formulas of the
form ιxrF,Gs to be considered. First, the conclusion of ιI is the major premise of
ιE1:
Σ1
Fxt
Σ2
Gxt
Σ3
D!t
Fxz
i
, D!z iloooomoooon
Π
z “ t
i
ιxrF,Gs
Fxv
j
, Gxv
j
, D!v jlooooooooomooooooooon
Ξ
C
j
C
Transform such steps in a deduction into the following, where Ξvt is the deduction
resulting from Ξ by replacing the variable v everywhere with the term t:
Fxt
Σ1
, Gxt
Σ2
, D!t
Σ3looooomooooon
Ξvt
C
The conditions on variables ensure that no clashes arise from the replacement.
Second, the conclusion of ιI is the major premise of ιE2:
Σ1
Fxt1
Σ2
Gxt1
Σ3
D!t1
Fxz
i
, D!z iloooomoooon
Π
z “ t1
i
ιxrF,Gs
Ξ1
D!t2
Ξ2
D!t3
Ξ3
Fxt2
Ξ4
Fxt3
t2 “ t3
Transform such steps in a deduction into the following, where Πzt2 and Π
z
t3 are
the deductions resulting from Π by replacing z with t2 and t3, respectively, and
the last rule is an application of “ E:
Fxt3
Ξ4
, D!t3
Ξ2loomoon
Πzt3
t3 “ t1
Fxt2
Ξ3
, D!t2
Ξ1loomoon
Πzt2
t2 “ t1
t2 “ t3
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The conditions on variables ensure that no clashes arise from the replacements.
The second reduction procedure for maximal formulas of the form ιxrF,Gs is
slightly unusual, as it appeals to a rule for another logical constant, i.e. identity.
However, as the conclusion of ιE2 is an identity, it is to be expected that its rules
may have to be appealed to in the workings of the rules for ι.
I only give two examples of permutative reduction procedures for formulas
of the form ιxrF,Gs that are the conclusion of_E, DE or ιE1 and the major premise
of ιE1 or ιE2. As in previous cases, clashes between variables are avoidable by
choosing different variables for the applications of DE and the elimination rules
for ι.
First example. The major premise of ιE1 is concluded by DE:
DvA
i
Avy
Σ
ιxrF,Gs
i
ιxrF,Gs
Fxz
j
, Gxz
j
, D!z jlooooooooomooooooooon
Π
C
j
C
Replace such steps in a deduction by:
DvA
i
Avy
Σ
ιxrF,Gs
Fxz
j
, Gxz
j
, D!z jlooooooooomooooooooon
Π
C
j
C
i
C
Second example. The major premise of ιE2 is the conclusion of DE:
DvA
i
Avy
Σ
ιxrF,Gs
i
ιxrF,Gs D!t1 D!t2 Fxt1 Fxt2
t1 “ t2
Replace such steps in a deduction by:
DvA
i
Avy
Σ
ιxrF,Gs D!t1 D!t2 Fxt1 Fxt2
t1 “ t2
it1 “ t2
The remaining cases are similar.
I am not counting ιE2 as an introduction rule for “. There is no general way
of removing formulas t1 “ t2 concluded by ιE2 and eliminated by “ E, as the
following illustrates:
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ιxrF,Gs D!t1 D!t2 Fxt1 Fxt2
t1 “ t2 Axt1
Axt2
Thus there are no further maximal formulas to be considered in INFι. After the
theorem, I will give an alternative second elimination rule for ι that avoids this
problem.
We have the following:
Theorem 1 For any deduction Π of A from Γ in INFι there is a deduction of the same
conclusion from some of the formulas in Γ that is in normal form.
Proof. By induction over the rank of proofs. The length of a segment is the
number of formulas it consists of and its degree the number of logical constants
in that formula. Let a maximal formula be a maximal segment of length 1. The
rank of a deduction is the pair xd, ly, where d is the highest degree of a maximal
segment or 0 if there is none, and l is the sum of the lengths of maximal segments
of highest degree. xd, ly ă xd1, l1y iff either (i) d ă d1 or (ii) d “ d1 and l ă l1.
Applying the reduction procedures to a suitably chosen maximal segment of
highest degree and longest length reduces the rank of a deduction.
We can reformulate the second elimination rule for ι to incorporate an application
of Leibniz’s Law instead of concluding with an identity:
ιxrF,Gs D!t1 D!t2 Fxt1 Fxt2 Axt1
ιE2A : Axt2
A can be restricted to atomic formulas, an induction over the complexity of
formulas showing that the general version with A a formula of any degree is
admissible. Call the system resulting from INFι by replacing ιE2 with ιE2A INFι1.
ιE2 and ιE2A are interderivable in virtue of the rules for identity:
1. To derive ιE2A, given premises ιxrF,Gs, D!t1, D!t2, Fxt1 and Fxt2 , derive t1 “ t2
by ιE2 and apply “ E to it and the premise Axt1 to derive Axt2 .
2. To derive ιE2, let A be t1 “ x, so that Axt1 is t1 “ t1: derive it from D!t1 by
“ In, apply ιE2A to derive Axt2 , i.e. t1 “ t2.
Thus INFι and INFι1 are equivalent.
In INFι1, steps in a deduction that conclude t1 “ t2 by ιE2A (with t1 “ t1 as
Axt1 ) and using it as the identity in Leibniz’ Law are redundant: ιE
2A can instead
be applied with the premise and conclusion of Leibniz’ Law. Such identities can
therefore be removed from deductions, and we are now at liberty to count them
amongst the maximal formulas.
If a maximal formula arises from introducing ιxrF,Gs by ιI and eliminating it
by ιE2A, we have the following situation:
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Σ1
Fxt1
Σ2
Gxt1
Σ3
D!t1
Fxz
i
, D!z iloooomoooon
Π
z “ t1
i
ιxrF,Gs D!t2
Ξ1
D!t3
Ξ2
Fxt2
Ξ3
Fxt3
Ξ4
Axt2
Ξ5
Axt3
We now have two options for removing the maximal formula. We can proceed as
previously: conclude t2 “ t3 by an application of Leibniz’ Law to the conclusions
t2 “ t1 of Πzt1 and t3 “ t1 of Πzt2 , and then apply Leibniz’ Law once more with Axt2
as further premise and Axt3 as conclusion. Alternatively, we can first conclude
Axt1 from the conclusion t2 “ t1 of Πzt1 and Axt2 , and then conclude Axt3 from Axt2
and the conclusion t3 “ t1 of Πzt2 . Thus deductions in the system resulting by
replacing ιE2 by ιE2A also normalise, and it has the additional advantage of
avoiding identities concluded by ιE2 and eliminated by Leibniz’ Law.
Thus we have the following:
Theorem 2 For any deduction Π of A from Γ in INFι1 there is a deduction of the same
conclusion from some formulas in Γ that is in normal form.
Deductions in INFι1 have slightly neater proof-theoretic properties than those in
INFι, as deductions in normal form in INFι1 do not contain redundant identities
introduced by ιE2 and eliminated by “ E. Deductions in INFι are, however,
slightly simpler if we are interested in establishing identities, and this will be
the case if we are interested in comparing the present system with the standard
treatment of ι as a term forming operator: axioms and rules for the latter
invariably appeal to identity.
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